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Zeigler: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. EQUAL PROTECTION-THE DOUBTFUL VITALITY OF THE
RATIONAL RELATION STANDARD FOR REVIEWING STATUTES

AFFECTING CIVIL LIABILITY IN SOUTH CAROLINA

The parental immunity doctrine in South Carolina traditionally prevented minors from bringing tort actions against
their parents. That restriction lost much of its force in 1962
when the South Carolina Legislature passed a statute, now codified at section 15-5-210 of the South Carolina Code, permitting
minors to sue their parents for injuries arising out of automobile
accidents. 1 In Elam v. Elam,' the South Carolina Supreme Court
ruled that section 15-5-210 violated the equal protection clauses
of the South Carolina and United States Constitutions.3 The
court in Elam also abolished, on equal protection grounds,
4
South Carolina's common-law doctrine of parental immunity.
In Elam, unemancipated minors were injured while riding
in automobiles driven by their parents. The minors brought negligence actions against their parents as permitted by section 155-210 of the South Carolina Code, 5 and the parents responded
by challenging the statute on equal protection grounds. 6 The
trial court found the statute unconstitutional, and the minors
appealed in order to preserve their right to recovery. Arguing for
the constitutionality of the statute, the minors contended that it
was rationally related to two legitimate state interests: "preserving family tranquility and.., protecting the victims of automobile accidents."" The supreme court, apparently unpersuaded by

1. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 15-5-210 provides that "[a]n unemancipated child may sue and
be sued by his parents in an action for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle
accident. In any such action there shall be appointed a guardian ad litem as provided by
law for such child."
2. - S.C. _,268 S.E.2d 109 (1980).
3. Id. at _,268 S.E.2d at 110.
4. Id. at _,268 S.E.2d at 110-11. For a discussion of the tort law aspects of Elam,
see Torts, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 33 S.C.L. REv. - (1981).
5. See note 1 supra for the text of the statute.
6. Record at 1-2.
7. Order at 6-.
8. Brief of Appellant at 5.
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this argument, stated that "there is no valid reason to treat unemancipated minors differently from their peers tortiously injured in other ways," cited to its earlier decision in Marley v.
Kirby, and affirmed the trial court's determination that section
15-5-210 was unconstitutional.'
In Marley, the court invalidated a statute that established
comparative negligence only for actions concerning motor vehicle accidents and explained that "the requirement of equal protection is not fulfilled unless the classification rests upon some
difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected." 10 The court then reasoned
that "the extension of [the state's police] power to alter a substantive rule of negligence law with respect to one class of persons [was] improper" and concluded that "there is no rational
basis for separating injuries from motor vehicle accidents from
injuries from other torts."1
The court's summary treatment of the equal protection issue in Elam is troublesome because the court, in considering the
constitutionality of section 15-5-210, failed to discuss the legislative purposes of the statute. Reliance on Marley cannot justify
this omission because Marley considered the constitutionality of
a different statute with presumably different legislative purposes. Moreover, the court in Marley also failed to discuss the
legislative purposes for the statute under review.
Elam is the latest in a line of equal protection cases in
which the court has examined the constitutionality of statutes
affecting civil remedies. In the earliest of these cases, Green v.
Zimmerman,12 the court upheld a statute that imposed strict liability on the owners of aircraft but held nonowner pilots to only
a negligence standard, 13 articulating the rational relation test as
follows: "[A] statute.

. .

promulgated under state authority will

be found to violate equal protection only when it results in discrimination against a certain class and the classification is not
rationally related to any legitimate state policy or interest." 4
9. 271 S.C. 121, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978).
10. Id. at 124, 245 S.E.2d at 606.
11. Id. at 124, 245 S.E.2d at 606.
12. 269 S.C. 535, 238 S.E.2d 323 (1977).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-3-60 (1976).

14. 269 S.C. at 540, 238 S.E.2d at 325 (citing Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171 (4th
Cir. 1974)).
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This formulation appears to dictate a two-prong test: the court
must first determine the legitimacy of the state policy or interest
on which a statute is based, and then the court must decide
whether the classification created by the statute is rationally related to the state policy or interest. In Green, the court discussed the legislative purposes on which the statute under review was based, determined them valid, and concluded that the
classification created by the statute was reasonable.1 5
Of the six equal protection decisions that followed Green,
the court has discussed the legislative purposes of the statute
under review in only two. State v. Smith' affirmed the constitutionality of a provision of the South Carolina Blue Laws that
permitted only those grocery stores with fewer than three employees to remain open on Sunday. 17 Observing that the purpose
of the statute was to provide for the health and welfare of the
populace by making grocery items available while extending a
day of rest to the maximum number of people, the court determined this purpose valid and concluded that the statute was
consistent with it.'8 Ramey v. Ramey" invalidated South Carolina's guest passenger statute0 because it was "limited to motor
vehicles and [was] accordingly defective under Marley." The
court discussed two legislative goals for the statute: "the protection of host drivers from suits by ungrateful guests; and ... the
elimination of collusive lawsuits" and concluded that the statute
served neither purpose.2 '
In the remaining decisions in the Green-Elam line, the
court gave no indication that it had considered the legislative
purposes for the statutes under review. Broome v. Truluck'2 invalidated a special statute of limitations that was applicable to
architects, engineers, and contractors who construct defective
buildings but not applicable to building owners.24 Without dis-

15. Id. at 540, 238 S.E.2d at 325.
16. 271 S.C. 317, 247 S.E.2d 331 (1978).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-1-40 (1976).
18. 271 S.C. at 320-21, 247 S.E.2d at 332.

19. 273 S.C. 680, 258 S.E.2d 883 (1979).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-290 (1976).
273 S.C. at 685-86, 258 S.E.2d at 886.
Id. at 683, 685, 258 S.E.2d at 884, 885.
270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978).
Id. at 229, 241 S.E.2d at 740.
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cussing the legislative purposes for the statute, the court nevertheless found no apparent rational basis for distinguishing between the two groups,2 5 despite acknowledgement by other
jurisdictions of various purposes for similar statutes.2 6 Marley,
cited by the court in Elam, failed to discuss the legislative purposes for the comparative negligence statute and ruled that -the
statute's effect, rather than its purpose, was invalid.2 8 Sapp v.
State Farm Automobile Insurance Co.29 upheld a statute that
denied unidentified motorist coverage for injuries caused by an
unidentified vehicle in the absence of physical contact with that
vehicleY' Without discussing the statute's legislative purposes,
the court summarily concluded that "the distinction is one
which the legislature was constitutionally privileged to make."8 1
Although the court purports to apply the rational relation
test in its equal protection decisions, it has failed to identify and
discuss legislative purposes for challenged statutes in the majority of its recent decisions reviewing the constitutionality of statutes challenged on equal protection grounds. Indeed, it has been
observed that "[t]he standards applicable to the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection have become little more than incantations, ritualistically preceding the court's determination of
'3 2
the merits of the particular case.
Elam lends further credence to the conclusion that the
South Carolina Supreme Court has retained the rational relation
test as its equal protection standard in name only. In the portion
of the Elam decision that abolished the parental immunity doctrine, the court noted that it was not "blind to the existence of
universal automobile liability insurance" or unaware that a minor's suit against his automobile-driving parent is, in reality, a

25. Id. at 231, 241 S.E.2d at 740.
26. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed,
401 U.S. 901 (1971); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662
(1972); Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 234 Pa. Super. 441, 341 A.2d 184 (1975); Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage
Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972). See Constitutional Law, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 31 S.C.L. REv. 21 (1980).
27. See notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text supra.
28. 271 S.C. at 125, 245 S.E.2d at 606.
29. 272 S.C. 301, 251 S.E.2d 745 (1979).
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-850 (1976).
31. 272 S.C. at 303, 251 S.E.2d at 746.
32. ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 26, at 32.
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suit against that parent's insurer.3 3 This implicit acknowledgement of a legislative purpose to which the statute might be rationally related, as well as the court's tacit repudiation of the
state's interests in preserving family tranquility and protecting
automobile accident victims, suggests that the court applied an

unarticulated but stricter standard under which it invalidated
the statutory classification by making a subjective evaluation of
the effects of the statute.
A standard other than the rational relation test is not ordinarily applied by federal courts3 4 and the courts of other
states, 5 except to statutes restricting fundamental rights and

classifications constituting invidious discrimination.

Indeed,

Justice Littlejohn, in his dissent to Ramey,17 called attention to
the firmly established South Carolina rule that "a statute will, if

possible, be construed so as to render it valid [and] will not be
declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the Constitution is clear and beyond reasonable doubt . . . ." In view of
the approach supported by the great weight of authority, the

South Carolina Supreme Court should return to an orthodox application of the rational relation test when determining the con-

stitutionality of statutes that do not restrict fundamental rights
or create classifications that constitute invidious discrimination.

II. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The separation of powers clause of the South Carolina Con-

33.

-

S.C. at

-,

268 S.E.2d at 111.

34. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
35. See Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978); Pendergast v. Nelson, 256
N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977); Botsch v. Reisdorf, 226 N.W.2d 121 (Neb. 1975); Arneson v.
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
36. An early but still authoritative exposition of the doctrine requiring strict scrutiny appears in Justice Stone's footnote in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938). Suspect classifications include race, Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); possibly illegitimacy see Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); but see Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976); and possibly gender, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), but see
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Fundamental rights generally are those rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
37. 273 S.C. at 686, 258 S.E.2d at 886 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 688, 258 S.E.2d at 886-87 (citing University of S.C. v. Mehlman, 245 S.C.
180, 139 S.E.2d 771 (1964); Nolletti v. Nolletti, 243 S.C. 20, 132 S.E.2d 11 (1963); Clark
v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E. 481 (1935).
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stitution provides that "[ifn the government of this State, the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the government
shall be forever separate and distinct from each other, and no
person or persons exercising the functions of one of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other."-"' In
State ex rel. McLeod v. Yonce,' 0 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that section 58-3-145 of the South Carolina Code,'
which required the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme
Court to appoint circuit judges to preside over contested utility
rate hearings, violated the separation of powers doctrine. The
court implied, however, that some overlapping of authority
among the branches of government might be permissible.'2 In
Williams v. Bordon's,Inc.,43 the court strictly construed the separation of powers clause and overturned section 2-1-150 of the
South Carolina Code, 44 which required state courts to grant au-

39. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8. Enacted shortly after federal occupation of the state following the Civil War, the separation of powers clause contained a provision, later
dropped, stating that its purpose was "to the end that. . .[South Carolina Government]
would be a government of laws and not of men." J. WOODRUFF, PROCEDNGS OF THE
CONSTrrUTioNAL CoNvmEroN 314 (1868). In the 1868 Constitution, the clause immediately followed provisions protecting individuals from suspension of law, S.C. CONST. of
1868, art. I, § 24, and from the imposition of martial law, S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 25.
The historical record clearly establishes that the clause was enacted primarily to protect
citizens from suspension of legal rights by legislative or executive usurpation of judicial
functions. Id.
40. 274 S.C. 81, 261 S.E.2d 303 (1979).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-3-145 (Supp. 1980) provides in part:
The Public Service Commission shall notify the Chief Justice of the South
Carolina Supreme Court of all pending contested rate matters where the
amount in controversy... [exceeds] one million dollars annually. The Chief
Justice, when so notified or when otherwise requested to do so by the Chairman of the Commission, shall appoint a circuit judge to preside over the hearings in such cases. Such judge shall have full authority to rule on questions
concerning the conduct of the case and the admission of evidence but shall not
participate in the determination on the merits of any such case.
42. 274 S.C. at 88, 261 S.E.2d at 306.
43. 274 S.C. 275, 262 S.E.2d 881 (1980).
44. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 2-1-150 (Supp. 1980) provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law or rule of court, no member
of the General Assembly shall be required to appear in court. . .during any
regular legislative day, on any day in which the General Assembly is in special
session, or on any other day when any legislator is required to attend any official legislative committee meeting ....
...The right to a continuance, where such continuance is based upon an
attorney in such a case being a member of the legislature, shall be a matter of
right except in the following situations and under the following circumstances,
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tomatic continuances to lawyer-legislators under certain circumstances. The court's indication of flexibility in Yonce is difficult
to reconcile with the strict construction set forth in Williams.
A.

Delegation of Executive Functions to the Judiciary

In Yonce, the court determined that the use of a circuit
judge as a presiding officer of the Public Service Commission infringed upon the authority of both the executive and legislative
branches of state government in violation of the separation of
powers clause. The court observed that the statute reposed in a
member of the judiciary "tremendous potential for influencing
45
the result of matters being considered" by an executive agency,
permitted the Chief Justice to appoint the presiding officer of an
administrative body, and "limit[ed] the authority of the Chief
Justice to use judges for judicial duties as required by Article V
[of the South Carolina Constitution]. 4 4 The court recognized,
however, that "some overlapping authority has been tolerated"
and ruled only that "the degree of involvement here is such that
the Constitution mandates that [the statute] be declared
4 7
invalid.
Yonce presents the first indication that the court may be
willing to construe the separation of powers clause flexibly to
permit limited overlap between the branches of state government. Just over two decades ago, in Board of Bank Control v.
Thomason, 5 in which it was held that a county court had only
limited power to review a decision by an administrative body,

and none other, to wit(1) where litigation involves emergency relief and irreparable damage;
(2) where such attorney has previously been granted continuances for the
same case for a period greater than one hundred eighty days; or
(3) in a criminal case where the client is incarcerated unless the defendant
shall give his written consent to the continuance.
45. 274 S.C. at 85, 261 S.E.2d at 305. One concern in delegating executive power to
the judiciary is that it may involve the judiciary in conflicts which may be common to
the executive and legislative branches but from which the judiciary should be isolated.
Yonce appears unique in recognizing, as an element for consideration in separation of
powers cases, the political dangers that may arise out of undue judicial involvement in
executive decision making.
46. S.C. CONsT. art. V, § 4, provides that the Chief Justice shall "have the power to
assign any judge to sit in any court within the unified judicial system."
47. 274 S.C. 88, 261 S.E.2d 306.
48. 236 S.C. 158, 113 S.E.2d 544 (1960).
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the supreme court observed that "[t]he basic proposition that a
constitutional court should not be required to perform non-judicial duties is probably beyond challenge. '49 Since Thomason, the
court has construed the separation of powers clause in a series of
decisions addressing overlapping functions of the executive and
legislative branches within the State Budget and Control Board,
an administrative board on which two legislators serve as ex officio members. In Elliott v. McNair,5" the court found no constitutional violation, but the court discussed only the issue of dual
office-holding, 51 and passed over the separation of powers issue
3 the court summarily
without discussion. 2 In Mims v. McNair,"
disposed of an asserted separation of powers violation on the
strength of Elliott.5 Soon after Mims, the South Carolina Constitution was revised,55 and, in the most recent challenge to the
constitutionality of the State Budget and Control Board, State
ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 6 the court held that the reenactment of the separation of powers clause without change signified
the General Assembly's contentment with the court's construction of the clause. The court further explained in dictum that
overlapping functions might be permitted where there is a cooperative effort between branches and no effort by one branch to
usurp the functions of another branch. 57 Yonce comports with
the court's tacit flexible construction of the separation of powers
clause in the Budget and Control Board cases but nevertheless
represents its first suggestion that overlapping executive and judicial functions may be permissible.
The courts of other states have been willing to sanction limited overlap of executive and judicial functions. The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Reiner, 8 analyzed the constitutional-

49. Id. at 165, 113 S.E.2d at 547.
50. 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967).
51. When Elliott was decided, the dual office holding proscription was contained in
S.C. CONST. art. II, § 2. Since that time, it has been transferred to S.C. CONST. art. XVII,
§ IA. Act No. 277, 1970 S.C. Acts, 57 Stat. 319.
52. 250 S.C. at 94-95, 156 S.E.2d at 431.
53. 252 S.C. 64, 165 S.E.2d 355 (1969).
54. Id. at 81, 165 S.E.2d at 363-64.
55. Act No. 1268, 1971 S.C. Acts, 56 Stat. 2684, transferred S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14,
to S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8.
56. 269 S.C. 75, 236 S.E.2d 406 (1977).
57. Id. at 83, 236 S.E.2d at 409.
58. 6 IlM. 2d 337, 129 N.E.2d 159 (1955)(statute requiring magistrate to forward re-
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ity of a statute requiring overlapping functions of the state's
executive and judicial branches and observed that the separation
of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution "does not command
that the judiciary be kept aloof from the general operation of
government beyond the point necessary to preserve judicial independence and to avoid the dissipation of energy which should
be conserved for judicial duties."5 9 In Hill v. Relyea,60 the Illinois court explained that delegation of a legislative function to
the judiciary is permissible as long as the function delegated
does not require judicial approval of administrative actions.6 1
The Florida Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Gerstein v.
Schwartz, 62 recognized that the legislature may constitutionally
"confer on the judiciary reasonable duties designed to control
law enforcement ..

."s The Court of Appeals of New York, in

Rosenthal v. McGoldrick," acknowledged that "the rule that the
judiciary may not be charged with administrative functions does
not apply when such functions are 'reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of judicial duties.' "65

The court in Yonce did not adopt a dogmatic approach to
the separation of powers guarantee but implicitly recognized
that, under conditions of minimal involvement, the legislature
may constitutionally delegate certain executive functions to judicial officers. 6 The court, in the spirit of Justice Holmes' observation that "we

. .

. cannot carry out the distinction between

[branches of government] with mathematical precison and divide the branches into watertight compartments, 8 7 indicated a
measure of flexibility and deference to practicality in applying
the separation of powers principle to state government. The degree of overlapping legislative and judicial functions that is permissible in South Carolina, however, remains to be defined.

ports of convictions of traffic offenses to Secretary of State constitutional).
59. Id. at 343-44, 129 N.E.2d at 162.

60. 34 Ill. 2d 552, 216 N.E.2d 795 (1966).
61. Id. at 557, 216 N.E.2d at 798.

62.
63.
64.
65.

357 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1978).
Id. at 168.
280 N.Y. 11, 19 N.E.2d 660 (1939).
Id. at 14, 19 N.E.2d at 661.

66. 274 S.C. at 88, 261 SXE.2d at 306.

67. Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211
(1928)(Holmes, J., dissenting). See 1 F. CoOmm, STATE AuimsmNTATm
(1965).
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B. ProceduralRulemaking Power
In Williams v. Bordon's,Inc.,6 8 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that a statute requiring state courts to grant automatic continuances to legislators in certain circumstances, 69 "in
so far as it attempts to exercise the ultimate authority to determine when, and under what circumstances, lawyer-legislators
may be exempt from court appearances, is unconstitutional as
violative of the principle of separation of powers."70 The supreme court then examined the trial court's denial of a motion
for continuance. It found that the trial court had abused its discretion and explained that "as a general rule, a request for a
continuance in a civil case because of counsel's legislative duties
should be granted, when timely requested and made in good
faith, unless a substantial right of the parties to the litigation
will be defeated or abridged by the delay.

71

The supreme court reasoned that the authority to grant
continuances has both historical and constitutional origins, and
explained that "[i]t has long been the rule in this State that motions for a continuance are addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial judge. 7'2 The court then traced the authority to grant
continuances to powers conferred on the state judiciary by the
South Carolina Constitution.73 Finally, relying on Carolina
Glass Co. v. State,7 4 the court ruled that the separation of
powers clause of the South Carolina Constitution prohibited the
legislature from exercising the judicial power to grant
75
continuances.

Although Williams' simultaneous abrogation of a procedural
68. 274 S.C. 275, 262 S.E.2d 881 (1980). See notes 43-44 and accompanying text
supra.
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1-150 (Supp. 1980) is set forth in part in note 44 supra.
70. 274 S.C. at 280, 262 S.E.2d at 884.
71. Id. at 280, 262 S.E.2d at 884.
72. Id. at 279, 262 S.E.2d at 883 (citing South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Carolina
Power & Light Co., 244 S.C. 466, 137 S.E.2d 507 (1964); State v. Lytchfield, 230 S.C. 405,
95 S.E.2d 857 (1957)).
73. S.C. CONsT. art. V, § 1, provides: "The judicial power shall be vested in a unified
judicial system which shall include a Supreme Court, a Circuit Court, and such other
courts of uniform jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law."
74. 87 S.C. 270, 69 S.E. 391 (1910), afl'd, 240 U.S. 305 (1916).
75. 272 S.C. at 280, 262 S.E.2d at 884. The separation of powers clause is found at
S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 8. For the full text of the provision, see the text accompanying note
39 supra.
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statute and announcement of a procedural rule made little difference in South Carolina procedural law regarding lawyer-legislators, the rationale used by the court is troublesome. The historical powers of the South Carolina judiciary may not be as
broad as the court indicated. It has been observed that since colonial times, the power to make procedural rules in this state has
resided in the legislature with the acquiescence of the courts. 7
Moreover, "[c]olonial and nineteenth-century American history
does not provide any additional support for an inherent procedural rule-making power in the judiciary. Quite the contrary, the
regulation of practice and procedure in the United States has
consisted largely of the 'persistent use of legislation.' "7 This
impugns the court's rationale in Williams that the rulemaking
power has historically resided in the judiciary.
The court's recognition of a constitutional basis for exclusive judicial authority to grant continuances can also be questioned. Although the court traced this authority to article V, section 1, of the state constitution, 8 it disregarded other arguably
apposite constitutional provisions. Article V, section 4, expressly
states that the supreme court's power to make rules governing
practice and procedure is "[s]ubject to the statutory law
...

. ,,79The

legislative history of this clause unequivocally es-

tablishes that the clause was intended to subordinate the rulemaking power of the court to the higher authority of the General
Assembly. 0 Further, article II, section 11, grants to the legislature the power to "compel the attendance of absent members."81
Because these constitutional provisions arguably authorize the
legislature to grant automatic continuances to lawyer-legislators,
the court's limitation of its discussion to article V, section 4,
appears incomplete.
Finally, the court in Williams cited CarolinaGlass"'to sup76. See 30 S.C.L. REv. 625, 628 (1979).
77. Id. at 637 (quoting Sunderland, The Exercise of the Rule-Making Power, 12
A.B.A.J. 548, 550 (1926).
78. For the text of S.C. CONST. art. V, § 1, see note 73 supra.
79. S.C. CONsT. art. V, § 4 provides in pertinent part: "The Supreme Court shall
make rules governing the administration of all the courts of the State. Subject to the
statutory law, the Supreme Court shall make rules governing the practice and procedure
in all such courts."
80. 30 S.C.L. REv. 625, 629-32 (1979).
81. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 11.
82. 87 S.C. 270, 69 S.E. 391 (1910), affd, 240 U.S. 305 (1916).
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port the proposition that the separation of powers clause8 s "is as
strong as it is simple and clear. The legislature therefore cannot
assume to itself the exercise of judicial powers."'" Yet in Carolina Glass, the court declined to set a clear boundary between
the legislative and judicial powers, explaining that "[tihe lines of
demarcation between the powers of the three departments are
often shadowy and illusive . .. ".
, The court in Carolina Glass
also noted that "[tihe exercise of judicial functions, or quasi judicial functions, is often necessary, as an incident, to the exercise of the powers conferred by the Constitution upon the other
co-ordinate branches of the government ..

."

Williams thus

seems to depart from the limited flexibility with which the court
in Carolina Glass construed the separation of powers clause.
Williams' pronouncement that procedural rulemaking
power is exclusively reserved to the judiciary constitutes a broad
extension of the judicial power coupled with a strict interpretation of the separation of powers clause. The basis for the broad
extension of the judicial power is tenuous, and the strict interpretation of the separation of powers clause is difficult to reconcile with the court's more flexible application of the clause in
State ex rel. McLeod v. Yonce.
Belton T. Zeigler

83.
84.
S.E. at
85.
86.

See text accompanying note 39 supra.
274 S.C. at 280, 262 S.E.2d at 884 (quoting Carolina Glass, 87 S.C. at 290, 69
399).
87 S.C. at 291, 69 S.E. at 399.
Id. at 291, 69 S.E. at 399.
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